WebMar 2, 2024 · This paper examines the behavior of the price of anarchy as a function of the traffic inflow in nonatomic congestion games with multiple origin/destination (O/D) pairs. … Webdue to selfish routing is not too large. Problem: a Nash flow can cost far more than an optimal flow. Solutions: • compare Nash to opt flow with extra traffic • restrict class of …
[PDF] Data-Driven Models of Selfish Routing: Why Price of Anarchy …
WebMar 2, 2024 · This paper examines the behavior of the price of anarchy as a function of the traffic inflow in nonatomic congestion games with multiple origin/destination (O/D) pairs. WebMar 1, 2012 · We study the price of anarchy of selfish routing with variable traffic rates and when the path cost is a nonadditive function of the edge costs. Nonadditive path costs are important, for example, in networking applications, where a key performance metric is the achievable throughput along a path, which is controlled by its bottleneck (most ... brighton high school football brighton tn
11 - Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy - Cambridge …
WebAug 5, 2016 · Last lecture proved generic tight bounds on the price of anarchy (POA) of selfish routing, parameterized by the edge cost functions. One particular instantiation of these bounds gives a rigorous justification for the common strategy of over-provisioning a communication network to achieve good performance (Section 12.1). WebOct 1, 2013 · For the demand rates of Table 2 the price of anarchy is calculated for varying levels of β and this simply examines the effect of the service value on the price of anarchy. The results are shown in Fig. 10 which is an illustration of Theorem 3.1 as the price of anarchy is increasing but seemingly converging to some upper bound. WebIn this paper, we study the price of anarchy of traffic routing, under the assumption that users are partially altruistic or spiteful. brighton high school graduation 2014